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THE NEIGHBORHOOD AS COMMONS:  
REFRAMING NEIGHBORHOOD DECLINE 
Ronald J. Oakerson* & Jeremy D. W. Clifton** 
ABSTRACT 
Neighborhood decline and the resulting erosion of the urban housing 
stock in the U.S. are typically viewed as products of forces beyond the 
control of cities.  Yet if urban neighborhoods have the characteristics of a 
commons, homeowners and landlords may adopt strategic behaviors that 
lead to a cycle of disinvestment in the housing stock, followed by 
abandonment.  Low-income neighborhoods may be especially vulnerable to 
this dynamic.  If decline is a tragedy of the commons, it is potentially 
avertible by neighborhood collective action.  Using principles drawn from 
research on common-pool resources, we develop a mode of analysis 
applicable to the neighborhood commons and apply it to an illustrative 
case on Buffalo’s West Side.  Because collective action among neighbors is 
largely tacit, not based on explicit agreements, it tends to be driven by 
individual perceptions.  The analysis suggests ways to reverse the 
disinvestment cycle by facilitating collective action:  fostering a shared 
sense of neighborhood responsibility among residents; strategically using 
neighborhood improvements to alter perceptions and thereby leverage 
reinvestment in the housing stock; and securing effective neighborhood 
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access to legitimate means of coercion for the enforcement of housing 
rules. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Neighborhood decline is a long-standing, perplexing problem in urban 
America,1 resulting in an ongoing deterioration of the housing stock, much 
of it abandoned and eventually demolished.2  Despite promising indications 
of urban revival at the turn of the century,3 the erosion of the housing stock 
has continued at an alarming rate.  Brookings reports that vacant housing 
increased by 4.5 million units, or forty-four percent, from 2000 to 2010, 
with vacancies concentrated in older, industrial cities:  “[b]oarded houses, 
abandoned factories and apartment buildings, and vacant storefronts are a 
                                                                                                                             
 1. See JAMES A. KUSHNER ET AL., HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT:  CASES 
AND MATERIALS 410-11 (4th ed. 2011). 
 2. JOHN A. JAKLE & DAVID WILSON, DERELICT LANDSCAPES:  THE WASTING OF 
AMERICA’S BUILT ENVIRONMENT 175-78 (1992). 
 3. See PAUL S. GROGAN & TONY PROSCIO, COMEBACK CITIES:  A BLUEPRINT FOR 
NEIGHBORHOOD REVIVAL (2000). 
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common part of the landscape in large cities like Detroit, Buffalo, and 
Philadelphia, and a host of smaller cities.”4 
Explanations of neighborhood decline have focused largely on factors 
beyond the control of cities:  an aging housing stock, suburbanization, and 
poverty.5  The standard model of neighborhood decline is based on income 
succession:  as neighborhoods age, lower-income residents succeed higher-
income residents who depart for newer housing elsewhere, leaving behind a 
housing stock increasingly costly to maintain.6  Whether as renters or 
homeowners, a succession of lower-income residents is less and less able to 
generate income sufficient to maintain the housing stock.7  In the extreme 
case, the supply of high-end suburban housing can increase to the point that 
demand for housing in some urban neighborhoods is reduced to zero, 
leaving sections of the city worthless and abandoned.8  Demolition is 
eventually followed by redevelopment, and the cycle begins again.9  The 
root cause of decline for many analysts is poverty.10  Given a housing 
market that responds to the demands of affluent residents, the only way to 
slow neighborhood decline in the succession model is to reduce the number 
and impact of low-income residents—those who can’t afford to maintain an 
aging housing stock. 
Suppose, however, that neighborhoods are not simply collections of 
aging houses but a distinct sort of commons, sharing the critical attributes 
of common-pool resources.11  If so, neighborhoods are potentially exposed 
to decline from within, based on an internally-driven, self-reinforcing 
dynamic of disinvestment that leads to abandonment.  Just as the “tragedy 
of the commons” works its way to an inevitable end no one wants,12 the 
neighborhood commons exhibits a remorseless decline ending in 
abandonment and demolition.  Although the biologist-cum-social 
                                                                                                                             
 4. ALAN MALLACH, BROOKINGS INST., LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR CHANGE:  
DEMOLITION, URBAN STRATEGY, AND POLICY REFORM 6 (2012). 
 5. GROGAN & PROSCIO, supra note 3, at 3. 
 6. KUSHNER ET AL., supra note 1, at 410. 
 7. Id. at 410-11. 
 8. See George Galster, On the Nature of Neighbourhood, 38 URB. STUD. 2111, 2118 
(2001). 
 9. See KUSHNER ET AL., supra note 1, at 410-41. 
 10. See ANTHONY DOWNS, NEIGHBORHOODS AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 12 (1981); 
WILLIAM GRIGSBY ET AL., THE DYNAMICS OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE AND DECLINE 58 
(1987). 
 11. See LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME:  PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND 
PROPERTY LINES (2009); RONALD J. OAKERSON, GOVERNING LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES:  
CREATING THE CIVIC METROPOLIS 47 (1999); Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the 
Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 (2011). 
 12. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
414 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
philosopher Garrett Hardin famously equated the commons with tragedy,13 
subsequent research by Elinor Ostrom and colleagues has shown that tragic 
outcomes can be averted through the collective action of commons users.14  
If neighborhoods exhibit a tragedy of the commons, it stems not from the 
nature of the commons but from an inability on the part of residents to act 
collectively. 
How a problem is framed has a direct bearing on how it is addressed.  
Framing neighborhood decline as a process of “succession,” urban 
policymakers may choose to watch the inevitable unfold and wait for 
opportunities to rebuild and redevelop.  Housing policy continues to focus 
on new construction even though, as Kushner and colleagues argue, “one 
must not lose sight of the need to retain existing stock if housing 
production is ultimately to meet the demand for housing.”15  Framed as a 
commons dynamic, neighborhood decline is no longer understood as an 
unrelenting process that leads to the wrecking ball but, rather, as a 
contingent problem subject to internal dynamics as well as external 
stresses, potentially responsive to neighborhood collective action—
provided that neighbors are able to act collectively.  It may even be 
possible for low-income neighborhoods to “remain stable and pleasant” 
places to live without having “to make everyone middle-class.”16 
In Part I we review a body of research that critically examined the 
succession model and found it wanting empirically—unable to explain 
neighborhood decline.  In Part II we develop the concept of the 
neighborhood commons as an alternative way of framing the process of 
decline.  We illustrate the application of the commons framework to urban 
neighborhoods in Part III, describing in detail a case of neighborhood 
decline and turnaround on Buffalo’s West Side.  In Part IV, we draw on the 
principles of commons governance developed by Elinor Ostrom,17 a 
political scientist and Nobel Laureate in economics, to analyze and explain 
the case.  We generalize and elaborate our argument in Part V, exploring 
key aspects of the neighborhood commons to suggest strategic 
interventions for facilitating neighborhood collective action to forestall 
urban decline. 
                                                                                                                             
 13. Id. 
 14. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:  THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
 15. KUSHNER ET AL., supra note 1, at 411. 
 16. See GROGAN & PROSCIO, supra note 3, at 2. 
 17. See OSTROM, supra note 14. 
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I.  SUCCESSION AND DECLINE:  PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
We begin by examining the empirical validity of the succession model.  
To do so, we distinguish between “succession,” which refers to the 
sequence of income groups, and “neighborhood decline,” which is 
predicted to follow on succession as average household income in the 
neighborhood decreases.  Although neighborhood decline is clearly 
multidimensional, including both objective and subjective conditions, the 
succession model focuses on the condition of housing as the crucial 
dependent variable.18  The key question is—how and under what 
circumstance does neighborhood income succession produce unfettered 
housing deterioration? 
Economist William Grigsby and colleagues rejected some oft-cited 
answers to this question.19  The succession model assumes that the 
maintenance requirements of housing increase with age.  Not so, they 
argued:  homes, unlike automobiles, can be “maintained almost 
indefinitely.”20  Because housing components deteriorate at different rates, 
each one can be repaired or replaced as needed, so that annual costs rarely 
exceed a small fraction of original construction costs.  Evidence further 
suggested that decline does not inevitability follow succession.  Decline 
can precede succession and succession can occur without decline ensuing.21  
The authors offered two possible explanations:  behavioral factors (“poor 
housekeeping, theft, vandalism, and assaults”) and externalities.22  The 
behavioral category is a mixed bag of variables with various possible 
sources—some based on the attributes of individual residents, others based 
on the activities of neighbors, and still others originating from outside the 
neighborhood.  The externality argument is more focused, based on a 
                                                                                                                             
 18. Neighborhood decline is often conceptualized to include both a decline in average 
household income in the neighborhood and the degradation of the housing stock. See 
JEROME ROTHENBERG ET AL., THE MAZE OF URBAN HOUSING MARKETS:  THEORY, EVIDENCE, 
AND POLICY 275-78 (1991).  In this article, we do not include demographic changes—such 
as an increase in the number of low-income residents—as a component of neighborhood 
decline, focusing instead on the condition of the housing stock.  Because the succession 
model posits an empirical relationship between demographic change as independent variable 
and housing quality as dependent variable, it is critical to maintain a distinction between the 
two concepts in order to test the model.  Moreover, although neighborhood decline is 
multidimensional, including not only the condition of the housing stock but also crime rates, 
urban infrastructure, and public services, as well as subjective qualities such as feelings of 
security or a sense of belonging, the condition of the housing stock is fundamental because 
its impact is cumulative.  If housing deterioration is unabated, the ultimate impact on a 
neighborhood is fatal—abandonment and demolition. 
 19. GRIGSBY ET AL., supra note 10. 
 20. Id. at 43. 
 21. Id. at 49. 
 22. Id. at 50. 
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recognition that the market value of a dwelling is affected not only by its 
own level of upkeep but also by the upkeep of surrounding structures, so 
that “property owners in deteriorating neighborhoods are not apt, 
unilaterally, to make repairs that would be economic only if other owners 
took steps to improve their structures as well.”23 
Economist George Galster conducted an elaborate cross-sectional 
study24 of the relationship between individual homeowner reinvestment 
decisions and aggregate neighborhood reinvestment in two cities—
Wooster, Ohio, and Minneapolis, Minnesota.25  He found no evidence that 
lower household income resulted in a greater incidence of exterior home 
defects, controlling for other factors.26  But he found clear evidence that a 
decline in neighborhood quality27 strongly tends to discourage homeowners 
from exterior maintenance.28  Furthermore, pessimism about the future of 
the neighborhood was associated with a reduction in annual expenditures 
on upkeep and an increase in exterior housing defects, especially in low-
quality neighborhoods.29  In particular, existing residents with relatively 
higher incomes are apt to reduce upkeep as lower-income residents enter, 
so that decline becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.30  Yet, he found that 
individual homeowners were motivated to invest “significant sums” in 
housing upkeep if both the homeowner and neighbors exhibited strong 
neighborhood solidarity31—with the effects of solidarity on upkeep 
estimated in the range of $142 to $376 per year during 1975-80.32 
Behavioral patterns, neighborhood externalities, self-fulfilling 
prophecies, and solidarity among neighbors are a product of neighborhood 
dynamics, not factors beyond their control.  Nonetheless, the original 
source of decline may still lie outside urban neighborhoods.  In subsequent 
                                                                                                                             
 23. Id. at 53. 
 24. Because a cross-sectional study compares neighborhoods at a point in time, it cannot 
directly show causation over time, which requires a longitudinal study of the same 
neighborhoods at different points in time.  Cross-sectional studies compensate by increasing 
the number of neighborhoods studied to include a variety of neighborhoods likely to be at 
different points in a process of investment or disinvestment. 
 25. GEORGE C. GALSTER, HOMEOWNERS AND NEIGHBORHOOD REINVESTMENT (1987). 
 26. Id. at 236. 
 27. Galster’s index of neighborhood quality combines property values, mean household 
income, and the percentage of dwellings with exterior defects. Id. at 85. 
 28. Id. at 197. 
 29. Id. at 229. 
 30. Id. at 237. 
 31. Neighborhood solidarity refers to a social dimension of neighborhoods measured by 
residents’ attitudes toward neighbors, including measures of perceived helpfulness, 
friendliness, similarity, and commonality. Id. at 88, 345. 
 32. Id. at 218-19. 
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work Rothenberg and colleagues,33 as well as Galster,34 argue that 
speculative housing development on the urban fringe aimed at upper-
income homeowners destabilizes the metropolitan housing market.  The 
effects of the increase in supply ripple through housing sub-markets from 
high to low quality, reducing prices and allowing lower income 
homeowners to enter previously unaffordable neighborhoods.  In this 
modified model of succession, the supply of new suburban housing drives 
the process of neighborhood decline.  Although the dynamic fosters upward 
mobility in housing as various income groups relocate from less to more 
desirable neighborhoods, the least desirable neighborhoods in the market 
are potentially left with vacant and abandoned housing.35 
Even if external forces prompt neighborhood change, however, it does 
not follow that decline is inexorable; rather, like a body responding to an 
externally contracted pathogen, outcomes depend on how neighborhoods 
respond.  Galster saw considerable scope for “collective intervention, 
whether it comes from informal social processes, non-profit, community-
based organizations or the governmental sector.”36  The efficacy of 
collective intervention depends, however, on choosing means of regulation 
that fit the problem and its context.37  All commons are not alike.38  
Effective collective action turns on the physical sources of commons-like 
attributes as well as attributes of commons users, both of which vary 
among different resources and situations.39  Understanding the particular 
attributes of neighborhoods that yield their commons-like character is 
critical to determining effective responses. 
II.  IS THE NEIGHBORHOOD A COMMONS? 
Whether an urban neighborhood can be usefully construed as a 
commons is open to question.  Aren’t neighborhoods divided between 
private space and public space?  Housing and the lot on which it sits is 
private space, while streets, sidewalks, and neighborhood parks are public 
spaces.  Private space is subject to exclusion and bought and sold on the 
                                                                                                                             
 33. See ROTHENBERG ET AL., supra note 18, ch. 9; Galster, supra note 8. 
 34. George Galster, A Structural Diagnosis and Prescription for Detroit’s Fiscal Crisis, 
37 J. URB. AFF. 17 (2015). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Galster, supra note 8, at 2122. 
 37. See Vincent Ostrom & Elinor Ostrom, Public Goods and Public Choices:  The 
Emergence of Public Economies and Industry Structures, in THE MEANING OF AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM:  CONSTITUTING A SELF-GOVERNING SOCIETY 187-88 (1991), for a discussion of 
the regulation of patterns of resource or facility use. 
 38. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 110-15 (1978). 
 39. ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 244-45 (2005). 
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market, while public space is open to all and owned by local governments.  
Where is the commons in this picture? 
Imagine two houses.  The first is a red-shuttered cottage with a white 
picket fence and gurgling fountain next to proud homeowners.  The second, 
nestled deep in a bed of weeds, offers a sagging porch, peeling paint, spotty 
roofing, a few boarded-up windows, and a broken pane through which you 
can see a squatter starting a fire on the floor boards as his companion 
prepares a line of heroin on a broken plate.  Place these two dwellings a 
mile apart on a country road and the homeowners are little affected.  But 
suppose we contract the distance.  As we move the blighted property closer 
and closer until it is next door, the value of the homeowner’s property 
plummets.  Of more immediate concern, Mom and Dad do not want their 
children exposed to obvious substance abuse, and they are worried about 
the fire raging out of control.  Unable to sell their house for what they paid 
for it, they instead rent it out.  Since they no longer have any incentive to 
invest in the property, a home once cherished becomes blighted in less than 
a decade.  After being flipped a few times, it is demolished, leaving another 
skinny empty lot disfiguring the streetscape. 
We argue that urban neighborhoods share the two defining 
characteristics of a commons:  non-excludability and subtractability.40  
Though most often applied to renewable natural resources, the concept of 
the commons is applicable to any durable asset used in common by 
multiple persons—roads and parks as well as pastures and fisheries.41  
Commons users are unable to exclude one another from the commons but 
can subtract from the benefit each user obtains.  As shown in Figure 1, the 
commons is distinguishable from three other types of goods:  private 
goods, which combine excludability and subtractability; public goods, 
which combine non-excludability and (relative) non-subtractability; and 
club goods (or toll goods), which combine excludability and non-
subtractability.42  Unlike pure private goods, to which individuals enjoy 
exclusive access, the commons allows access to multiple users who are 
unable to exclude one another.  Unlike pure public goods, which 
                                                                                                                             
 40. We follow Elinor Ostrom’s usage with the term “subtractability.” See Ostrom & 
Ostrom, supra note 37, at 165-67.  Others use the term “rivalry.”  The difficulty with 
characterizing use of the commons as inherently rival is that rivalry connotes competition.  
While it is true that commons use can be and frequently is competitive, it can also be 
cooperative.  The inherent characteristic of the commons is that individual use potentially 
subtracts from the quantity or quality of the resource available to others. 
 41. Ronald J. Oakerson, Analyzing the Commons:  A Framework, in MAKING THE 
COMMONS WORK:  THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 41-59 (Daniel W. Bromley et al. eds., 
1992). 
 42. Ostrom & Ostrom, supra note 37, at 164-68.  Ostrom & Ostrom use the term “toll 
goods” for what others label “club goods.” 
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individuals can enjoy without subtracting from the flow of benefits to other 
users, the commons is subject to overuse or misuse, subtracting from the 
flow of benefits. 
Figure 1:  Types of Goods43 
Like public goods and club goods, the commons allows individuals to 
share the use of a resource or facility, but it is sharing within limits; outside 
those limits, subtractive use threatens the shared asset that produces joint 
benefits, as when fishers deplete a fishery,44 pastoralists overgraze a 
pasture,45 or overweight vehicles destroy a road.46  If an individual user 
were able to obtain exclusive control of the resource, as in the case of 
private goods, subtractability would be unproblematic:  a single user can 
limit use without being concerned over the behavior of other users.  The 
commons is more problematic:  when subtractability occurs alongside a 
weak ability to exclude others, individuals must act collectively to 
constrain use.  Collective action among users is feasible when limited to the 
members of a well-defined community, such as a local fishing village, but 
when the inability to exclude extends to persons from outside such a 
community, the resulting “open access” condition destroys the capability 
for collective action among users.47 
                                                                                                                             
 43. Adapted from OSTROM, supra note 39, at 24 fig. 1.3, Four Basic Types of Goods.  
Ostrom treats what are called here club goods as “toll goods.” 
 44. See, e.g., Fikret Berkes, Success and Failure in Marine Coastal Fisheries of Turkey, 
in MAKING THE COMMONS WORK, supra note 41, at 161-82. 
 45. See ROBERT WADE, VILLAGE REPUBLICS:  ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FOR COLLECTIVE 
ACTION IN SOUTH INDIA 59-61 (1994).  Wade provides an excellent, succinct discussion of 
the practical problems associated with open-field management. 
 46. See, e.g., Ronald J. Oakerson, Erosion of Public Goods:  The Case of Coal-Haul 
Roads in Eastern Kentucky, in 2 RESEARCH IN PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 
73-102 (1981). 
 47. Hardin, supra note 12, tacitly assumed open access, but many common-pool 
resources are governed as common property—owned in common by a user community. See 
Daniel W. Bromley, The Commons, Property, and Common-Property Regimes, in MAKING 
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Neighborhoods exhibit weak excludability.  Absent extraordinary 
collective powers, neighborhood residents are unable to exclude any of 
their neighbors from the neighborhood.  Residents cannot be expelled, nor 
newcomers barred entry.  However, the requirement that one purchase or 
rent property to become a neighborhood householder precludes fully open 
access, creating a limited and well-defined community of commons 
residents.  New household entrants nevertheless do not need permission 
from existing residents or property owners.  Although zoning can function 
in an exclusionary manner by influencing the type of housing built, once 
housing is in place, homeowner entry requires only a willing seller and a 
willing buyer.  Neighborhoods are generally open, however, to simple 
ingress by anyone—an open-access condition—unless the streets and 
sidewalks are held privately, gated communities being the growing 
exception.48 Cities thrive on such openness, but it can also allow 
neighborhood entry by unsavory visitors who subtract from the enjoyment 
of the neighborhood by its residents.  Neighborhoods are also subject to 
crowding, when the number of people occupying housing exceeds 
capacity.49 
This quasi-open neighborhood space—its openness constrained by the 
real estate market—is shared by a well-defined set of residents under 
conditions of subtractability.  The neighborhood commons is 
multidimensional:  it includes an air shed, sound shed, streetscape, and 
social space, all of which supply a stream of benefits and costs necessarily 
shared among neighbors.  The dimensions combine, however, to influence 
strongly the market value of neighborhood real estate.  Neighbors affect 
one another’s property values and amenities in myriad ways.  Legal scholar 
Lee Ann Fennell cites “lawn maintenance, rubbish control, yard art, 
external painting, on-site car repairs, and pet-keeping” as potential sources 
of subtractability, further suggesting that “absent some constraint, owners 
might shift residential parcels into more intensive and lucrative uses,” that 
                                                                                                                             
THE COMMONS WORK, supra note 41, at 3-15.  Open access is an extreme form of non-
excludability, but weak exclusion does not necessarily imply open access.  Non-
excludability is a characteristic among commons users; even when there is a well-defined 
community of users, the members of that community may not be able to exclude one 
another.  The commons is necessarily shared, and individual users must take into account 
the behavior of others on the commons. FENNELL, supra note 11, at 54, argues that 
neighborhoods “fall closer to the limited access end of the spectrum than the open-access 
end.”  We agree, but this does not mean that residents are able to practice neighborhood 
exclusion.  It means, rather, that the community of residents in the neighborhood is limited 
and well defined, not open to anyone who wants to pitch a tent. 
 48. See ROBERT H. NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 30 (2005). 
 49. See ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 31-32 (3d ed. 
2015). 
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degrade the neighborhood.50  Neighborhood standards can be expected to 
differ, however, so that the subtractability of various uses and behaviors 
must be viewed as context-dependent.51 
Depending on the prevailing neighborhood standard, subtractability 
affects the incentives of property owners in two ways.  First, a commons 
user needs assurance that other users will cooperate before agreeing to act 
collectively; otherwise, an individual contribution is futile.  This is the 
primary collective action problem.52  Given assurance, however, the same 
user may still have a strong incentive to defect and free-ride on the benefits 
provided by others, especially when individual members of the user 
community cannot be excluded.53  For this reason, collective action may 
depend on continuous monitoring and enforcement.  In the case of 
neighborhoods, however, free rider incentives are muted:  maintenance and 
investment on the part of neighbors can increase a homeowner’s incentive 
to maintain and invest.  Community development expert William Simon 
explains:  “If your neighbors paint their houses, you will benefit simply 
because the neighborhood is more attractive (an externality effect); it may 
also be true that the benefit from painting your house will now be greater 
than it would have been if they had not painted theirs (a complementary 
effect).”54  While performing maintenance produces positive externalities, 
it also produces complementary benefits that neighbors can claim only if 
they reciprocate. 
We argue that homeowners benefit individually from performing 
maintenance because it (1) maintains or increases property values, (2) 
sustains or improves the livability of the home, and (3) earns the esteem of 
neighbors.  Therefore, when assured that others will maintain their 
property, most neighbors maintain their own property out of self-interest.  
Because complementarities between neighboring properties counteract free 
rider incentives, the only required sanctions are provided by the market 
(declining property values), the personal inconvenience associated with a 
                                                                                                                             
 50. FENNELL, supra note 11, at 67. 
 51. A “lower” standard does not imply there is no standard; even residents of the poorest 
neighborhoods may attempt to enforce standards of behavior and upkeep through social 
pressure. See, e.g., SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS:  THE UNDERGROUND 
ECONOMY OF THE URBAN POOR 166-213 (2009). 
 52. C. Ford Runge, Common Property and Collective Action in Economic Development, 
in MAKING THE COMMONS WORK, supra note 41, at 17. 
 53. OSTROM, supra note 39, at 24-25. 
 54. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT 44 
(2001).  The fact that free rider incentives are muted does not mean they are eliminated.  
JAKLE & WILSON, supra note 2, at 175, argue that landlords in a degraded neighborhood are 
especially likely to choose a free rider strategy.  If others respond to free riders by reducing 
maintenance, however, the free rider strategy is ultimately unsuccessful, and the free rider’s 
property value declines along with the rest of the neighborhood. 
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leaky roof or broken steps (livability), or informal social pressures (a desire 
for neighborhood esteem).  The benefits of individual maintenance are 
discounted, however, when assurance is missing because neighbors fail to 
maintain their homes, and neighborhood standards loosen.  Virtually all 
property owners are exposed to economic circumstances that potentially 
lead to neglect of maintenance in order to meet other, more pressing needs, 
but circumstances such as unemployment or sudden medical expenses are 
closer at hand in low-income neighborhoods, or elsewhere as well during 
an economic downturn.  When neighbors reduce their upkeep, whatever the 
reason, the economic return on maintenance declines but maintenance costs 
remain the same.  Therefore, we argue, the neighborhood commons varies, 
both across neighborhoods and across time, in its need for monitoring and 
enforcement of upkeep.  In particular, low-income neighborhoods are more 
likely to require monitoring and enforcement of their own neighborhood 
standards. 
To sum up:  an urban neighborhood, where neighbors live in close 
proximity, is a distinct sort of commons.  A residential neighborhood has 
the defining characteristics of a commons:  neighbors both cannot exclude 
one another from the neighborhood and have the potential to subtract from 
the value of the neighborhood (as well as add to it).  The subtractive 
behaviors of individual households are reflected in the market value of 
neighboring property.  To limit subtractive behaviors and thereby sustain 
the value of the neighborhood, neighbors must act collectively.  Although 
tacit, home maintenance in an urban neighborhood is collective action—
individual behavior strongly influenced by the behavior of neighbors.  The 
free-rider incentives inherent in collective action are weakened, however, 
by complementarities among neighbors:  instead of free riding on the home 
maintenance of neighbors, residents realize a greater gain from 
maintenance when neighbors are also maintaining their property.  The 
problem of collective action in urban neighborhoods is how to sustain 
mutual assurance, not how to prevent freeriding.  Mutual assurance is 
threatened less by free riders than by holdouts—persons who refuse to 
cooperate, allowing, in this case, housing to deteriorate regardless of what 
neighbors do.55  Collective action is feasible because a limited set of 
individuals share the neighborhood; not a fully open-access commons, 
except in the limited case of street ingress and egress, the neighborhood is a 
                                                                                                                             
 55. Holdouts and free riders are frequently conflated but reflect quite different 
strategies, relating to collective action at different points in the process.  Free riders seek to 
take advantage of the contributions of others ex post, perhaps by non-compliance with rules 
previously agreed to, while holdouts frustrate collective action ex ante by withholding 
assurance of participation.  Holdouts can become free riders when others choose to act 
collectively. See VINCENT OSTROM, THE INTELLECTUAL CRISIS IN AMERICAN PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 50 (2d ed. 1989). 
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well-defined community of householders and property owners.  The nature 
of the community, however, does not guarantee collective action:  some 
property owners may still adopt holdout strategies, leaving urban 
neighborhoods exposed to the tragedy of the commons.  The probability 
that residents or landlords will face circumstances prompting them to 
withhold maintenance is higher in low-income neighborhoods. 
III.  AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE ON BUFFALO’S WEST SIDE56 
In 2002, a handful of West Side residents in Buffalo, NY, formed the 
West Side Community Collaborative to address problems in a fifteen-block 
area sandwiched between Richmond Avenue, a major north-south 
thoroughfare, and the Niagara River. Comprised of approximately 11,000 
residents in 5000 homes, the area is one of the most ethnically diverse 
neighborhoods in the state, consisting of roughly equal parts white, African 
American, Hispanic, Asian, and mixed race.57  Six blocks east, Elmwood 
Avenue, a business corridor parallel to Richmond, was attracting an 
increasingly affluent population to what came to be called “Elmwood 
Village.”  Richmond was a boundary street; realtors distinguished sharply 
between properties on its east side and west side.  Collaborative leader 
Harvey Garrett (hereinafter “Harvey”) described the stark difference 
observed after crossing Richmond east to west:  on the first street west of 
Richmond, there were 
                                                                                                                             
 56. Our account of the case is based primarily on a 2009 interview with Harvey Garrett, 
Director of the West Side Community Collaborative, which was followed by numerous 
emails, questions, and walking tours of the area. Interview with Harvey Garrett, Dir., W. 
Side Cmty. Collaborative, in Buffalo, N.Y. (Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Garrett].  Other 
sources include the first-hand experience of co-author Jeremy Clifton as a community 
development practitioner on the West Side from 2007 to 2010, who lived and worked a few 
blocks northwest of the study area.  As an active member of the Collaborative, Clifton 
attended monthly meetings and worked closely with a wide range of community leaders, 
who willingly shared their knowledge, contacts, and methods.  Many aspects of the narrative 
we supply here were common knowledge among Collaborative members.  Other aspects, 
such as home prices and the basic chronology of events, were confirmed by various public 
records, as noted.  In addition, we drew upon two extensive interviews with Housing Court 
Judge Henry Nowak. Interviews with Henry Nowak, Judge, Buffalo Hous. Court, in 
Buffalo, N.Y. (Nov. 13, 2009 & Feb. 26 2010) [hereinafter Nowak].  Clifton worked 
alongside Harvey Garrett and others as a Housing Court Community Liaison.  Both Garrett 
and Judge Nowak read drafts of this paper and provided comment. 
 57. LOCAL INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP., WEST SIDE COMMUNITY COLLABORATIVE:  
POOLING AND TARGETING RESOURCES 2 (2005), https://casesimportal.newark.rutgers.edu
/storage/documents/multi_level_governance_networking/nonprofit/case/2004_MetLife_Aw
ards_-_West_Side_Community_Collaborative.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AKL-5433] 
[hereinafter LISC]; see also West Side neighborhood in Buffalo, New York, CITY-
DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/neighborhood/West-Side-Buffalo-NY.html 
[https://perma.cc/AG53-XZWV]. 
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[P]rostitutes, drug dealers, several vacant houses, crime, the property 
values declining, nobody wanted to be there. The next block 
over . . . [there were] 12 vacant properties in three blocks.  Nobody 
wanted to be there.  The next block over . . . [was] one of the most violent 
neighborhoods on the city’s west side . . . . So . . . you had 
200,000 . . . dollar houses on Richmond Avenue [while] one block over . . 
. you could buy a house for 2,000 dollars.58 
Though the City’s response to the deteriorating housing stock was 
mainly demolition,59 the housing stock offered opportunity for low-income 
households.  Early residents had built durable housing, and an unusually 
high percentage of them were doubles—two apartments built one on top of 
the other.60  A homeowner would often live in one apartment and rent the 
other for the mortgage payment. 
Initially formed to implement a five-year revitalization plan, the 
Collaborative became a multi-level association bringing together 
neighborhood residents and block clubs, community organizations, 
government agencies, law enforcement, realtors, and banks.61  It pursued 
three related objectives:  (1) to increase homeownership without excluding 
responsible tenants and landlords; (2) to turn qualified tenants into 
homeowners; and (3) to encourage a mixed-income population in order to 
help build its commercial district (believing that low income populations 
alone cannot support prosperous commercial districts).62  The group chose 
a “block-by-block” strategy:  what if they could move the boundary located 
on Richmond westward, one block at a time? Even if crime and blight were 
eradicated on a single block in the middle of the West Side, nobody would 
                                                                                                                             
 58. Garrett, supra note 56. 
 59. Id.; see also Moving Buffalo Forward, in 1 POLICY BRIEFS FROM THE BROWN 
ADMINISTRATION 4 (2007) While the City of Buffalo has pursued various programs with 
different degrees of success, the primary response to the ongoing problem of the 
deteriorating housing stock has been demolition.  For example, Mayor Byron Brown’s “5 in 
5” Demolition Plan, published in August of 2007, sought to demolish 5000 properties in five 
years at an estimated cost of $100 million.  By 2010, 4000 homes had been demolished at a 
cost of $61 million. See Justin Sondel, No Vacancy, CTR. FOR CMTY. PROGRESS (Oct. 19, 
2010), http://www.communityprogress.net/news—-events-pages-9.php?id=44 
[https://perma.cc/Q678-KUKR]. 
 60. Garrett, supra note 56.  In 2010, there were 20,908 vacant and 112,536 occupied 
properties in Buffalo.  Among the occupied units, 36.1% were two-apartment detached 
houses, a somewhat distinctive architectural feature especially common on the West Side. 
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PHYSICAL HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS FOR OCCUPIED HOUSING 
UNITS 2006-2010 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 5-YEAR ESTIMATES https://factfinder.
census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF; [https://perma.cc/FR
5W-T53J]; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS:  2010; 
https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/DEC/10_SF1/QTH1/1600000US3611000 
[https://perma.cc/RE5A-Q7PG]. 
 61. Garrett, supra note 56; LISC, supra note 57. 
 62. Garrett, supra note 56. 
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relocate there because of too much surrounding risk.  Block by block, the 
group reasoned, investment would encourage investment.63 
In year one the Collaborative tackled the first three blocks west of 
Richmond.64  Residents organized block clubs, whose activities included 
cleaning up vacant lots, painting both occupied and abandoned houses, 
planting gardens, picking up trash, repairing sidewalks, fostering 
communication between residents, and addressing street crime and 
disorder.  The second year the Collaborative did the same for the next three 
blocks while finding homeowners for the first three.65 
We focus on Alexis Street,66 which experienced both decline and 
renewal within a relatively brief time frame:  2002 to 2010.  The study area 
comprises a street-block:  fourteen houses and one multi-use facility face 
each other on opposite sides of the street between intersecting streets at 
each end of the block.  Its residents reflect the diversity found more broadly 
on the West Side.67  One of the first blocks the Collaborative targeted for 
action, it provided a testing ground for strategies later employed across the 
wider area. 
When the Collaborative began work in 2002, paint peeled off nearly 
uniformly shabby exteriors up and down the street, almost all unpaved 
areas were overgrown, and police mostly stayed away.68  A drug gang 
worked out of two houses occupying the front and rear of one lot, while 
next door a prostitution ring occupied two houses, also on the front and rear 
of the lot.  One landlord, a non-resident, owned all four houses, each one 
divided into apartments.  The houses were falling apart; even the roofs 
were caving in.  Hoses ran out of windows oozing foul goop.  Some 
apartments had squatters; others, even squatters could not tolerate.69 
Across the narrow street, the Browns70 had lived in a house at the rear of 
their lot, a double lot, for ten years.  They rented out one home at the front 
and another at the rear of their large parcel.71  Their property was strikingly 
well-maintained, and they kept a flower garden in the vacant front portion 
of their lot.  Finally, tired of not feeling safe and unable to keep good 
                                                                                                                             
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. In order to preserve the anonymity of residents we use a fictional name for the street. 
 67. Author’s observation (Clifton). 
 68. Garrett, supra note 56. 
 69. Id.  Structures on one lot were built in 1900, and structures on the other lot were 
built in 1920. ZILLOW, http://www.zillow.com (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).  Web links that 
would identify specific properties are not included to preserve anonymity. 
 70. All names of residents are fictitious. 
 71. Zillow suggests the structures on this lot were built in 1940. ZILLOW, supra note 69.  
Web links that would identify specific properties are not included to preserve anonymity. 
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quality tenants, they were on the verge of leaving in 2002.72  Down the 
block a large deteriorating two-story complex housed a combination of 
offices and apartments.  At one end of the block was a nineteenth century 
tavern,73 fronting on the intersecting street.  In 2002, a late-partying 
clientele often kept residents awake at night and occasionally wandered 
away from the tavern’s patio to defecate on neighbors’ lawns.74  In 2003, 
the New York State smoking ban pushed more rowdiness into the street.75 
Just prior to the Collaborative’s intervention, a house at one end of the 
block that fronted on the intersecting street sold to a young, low-income 
couple for $2000.76  An enormous 3334 square foot77 single-family 
dwelling divided into multiple apartments, it was for many years a drug 
house and had fallen into disrepair.  Immediately upon purchase, the new 
owners completely remodeled the interior and replaced the roof, while 
slowly improving the exterior.  However, their work did not spark further 
improvement on the street.78 
The Collaborative identified the drug gang and prostitution ring as 
priority concerns.79  Fear of the gang was a critical problem because it 
inhibited neighborhood communication.  Neighbors could not meet openly, 
and residents stayed off their front porches.  In the Collaborative’s view, 
however, the root of the problem was the property owner, not his 
troublesome tenants.  Focusing on the drug-dealers and prostitutes would 
have meant relying mainly on police and the criminal justice system.  
Instead, the Collaborative found a reliable partner in Buffalo’s Housing 
Court, which hears all housing-related cases.80  Graffiti, uncut grass, 
                                                                                                                             
 72. Garrett, supra note 56. 
 73. Source for date is the tavern’s website.  Web links that would identify specific 
properties are not included to preserve anonymity. 
 74. Garrett, supra note 56; confirmed by anonymous Alexis resident. 
 75. Id. While the 1997 Erie County Clean Air Act did limit smoking in the workplace, 
bars were exempted. Erie County, N.Y., Erie County Clean Air Act (1997), 
http://www2.erie.gov/law/index.php?q=erie-county039s-clean-air-act [https://perma.cc
/VN95-7S2R].  For coverage of the statewide 2003 ban, see Winnie Hu, New York State 
Adopts Strict Ban on Workplace Smoking, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/27/nyregion/new-york-state-adopts-strict-ban-on-work
place-smoking.html [https://perma.cc/LR2S-BTAS]. 
 76. Garrett, supra note 56.  Zillow reports that this lot was sold for $2050.  This $50 
difference was the only discrepancy we found between Harvey’s first-hand account of the 
Alexis Street story and what we could gather from public records. ZILLOW, supra note 69.  
Web links that would identify specific properties are not included to preserve anonymity. 
 77. ZILLOW, supra note 69. 
 78. Garrett, supra note 56. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.; see also infra Section V.C. 
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peeling paint, and sagging porches are not only indicators of neglect—they 
are housing code violations.81 
The first step was to get the attention of the city’s housing inspectors.  
Harvey reports, “Because the city had given up on the area west of 
Richmond, inspectors did not think it [inspecting the properties] was worth 
their time.”82  The Collaborative responded by monitoring the inspection 
process itself—repeatedly calling inspectors, visiting the properties with 
them, taking photographs, and showing up in court with prints.83 
Once the properties were in court, the Collaborative discovered that for 
two decades all four houses had been repeatedly cited for similar 
violations.84  Each time, they were dismissed for “substantial compliance,” 
which meant that owners had demonstrated progress and it was simply 
assumed they would finish.85  This time, on the advice of neighborhood 
residents, the judge gave the owner four options:  he could (1) fully repair 
the houses; (2) demolish the houses; (3) transfer the properties to someone 
the court was confident would repair and maintain them; or (4) go to jail.86  
During the next several court hearings, neighborhood residents provided 
evidence that the landlord had patched holes in walls with bits of salvaged 
roofing material and applied mismatched leftover paint.87  When the judge 
made it clear that jail time was imminent, the landlord put the properties on 
the market for $100,000; no buyers were interested.88  At this point the 
Collaborative sought the assistance of a private, nonprofit housing 
agency,89 which made an offer of $15,000.  He accepted.90 
                                                                                                                             
 81. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text. 
 82. Garrett, supra note 56.  For a related discussion of “regulatory slippage” in cities, 
see Foster, supra note 11. 
 83. See Garrett, supra note 56.  Confirmed by anonymous West Side residents who took 
photos, printed them, and brought them to court. 
 84. See id.  A major factor contributing to the decline in motivation for inspectors to 
inspect these properties was that inspection did not seem to make an impact. See id. 
 85. Id.  In Buffalo, Housing Inspectors conduct an initial re-inspection of properties 
violating the housing code.  If progress is being made, they can cite “substantial 
compliance” and the case does not come before housing court. CITY OF BUFFALO, N.Y., 
CODE ch. 264, Rental Dwelling Unit Registration (2013), http://www.mcs360.com
/documents/compliancedoc/VPR/VPR%20Ordinance%20-%20Buffalo,%20NY.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9KT2-DT7Z].  After the case comes before the court, the judge can do the 
same at her discretion.  Nowak, supra note 56. 
 86. Garrett, supra note 56; see also Nowak, supra note 56. 
 87. Garrett, supra note 56. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Such agencies typically provide an array of housing-related services with both 
governmental and nongovernmental support. 
 90. Garrett, supra note 56. 
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As the new landlord, the housing agency evicted the prostitution ring 
and drug gang without incident.91  Two houses, one on the front of a lot and 
the other at the rear of an adjacent lot, were deemed to be unsalvageable 
and were demolished.  Following a period of inactivity, during which time 
Collaborative members grew increasingly frustrated and insistent on 
action,92 the housing agency began investing what would eventually 
become $200,000 in repairs on both properties, including extensive exterior 
work.93  One house was renovated within a year, but renovations on the 
second house were delayed, eventually spanning four construction 
seasons.94  In the meantime a donor provided paint at cost, and the 
Collaborative began to repaint exteriors up and down the block.  At their 
own expense they also put up a tall fence to hide the un-renovated structure 
while pushing the housing agency to begin renovations.95  Householders 
planted gardens and used available materials, such as an old wine press and 
granite slabs, to add character to the streetscape.  In a fairly short time the 
street began to look more attractive. 
In 2003 real estate activity and investment began to increase.  Next door 
to the former drug house, an old carriage house built at the start of the 
twentieth century had stood vacant and deteriorating for years.  It sold in 
June 2003 for approximately $6000.96  The new owners stripped off nasty 
green paint to expose pleasing brick. Once well-maintained housing 
replaced the former hives of criminality and blight, the longsuffering 
Browns began to re-invest.  Starting in 2003, after the housing agency 
made its purchase, they re-sided, re-painted, and re-roofed their home, 
added a new driveway, and installed new windows in all three of their 
housing structures.97  Wanda was a tenant who lived next door to the 
Browns; raising her son across the street from the prostitution ring and drug 
                                                                                                                             
 91. Id. 
 92. See Marilyn Rodgers, West Side Babes, BUFFALO RISING (Sept. 27, 2007), 
https://www.buffalorising.com/2007/09/west-side-babes/ [https://perma.cc/F3K3-8QYM].  
Based in part on this experience, the Collaborative changed tactics.  Instead of seeking 
external, non-profit, or government-funded investors, they would prioritize finding other 
buyers, especially homeowners. 
 93. Id. 
 94. E-mail from Harvey Garrett, Dir., W. Side Cmty. Collaborative, to the authors (Dec. 
13, 2010, 10:55 AM) (on file with authors).  Timeline identified by public records.  
REALTOR, www.realtor.com (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).  Web links that would identify 
specific properties are not included to preserve anonymity. 
 95. E-mail from Harvey Garrett, Dir., W. Side Cmty. Collaborative, to the authors (Dec. 
13, 2010, 10:55 AM) (on file with authors). 
 96. Garrett, supra note 56.  Price and date confirmed by public records. REALTOR, supra 
note 94.  Web links that would identify specific properties are not included to preserve 
anonymity. 
 97. Garrett, supra note 56. 
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gang, she expressed a determination never to buy property on the block.  In 
2004, she purchased a renovated house from the housing agency for 
$67,500 and, moreover, became a block club leader.98  Wanda’s house was 
a double, allowing her to rent the lower apartment for $500 a month and 
cover most of her mortgage payment.99 
Over the next two years real estate activity accelerated, and five 
dwellings were converted from rental to homeowner status.  In 2005 two 
houses sold for around $30,000.100  In 2006, one of those houses sold again 
for $80,000.  Renovations on the remaining housing-agency property were 
completed in 2006 and sold to a homeowner for $75,000.101  Between 2008 
and 2010 four houses were sold (some were repeat sales) as real estate 
prices on the block increased, reaching more than $150,000 by the end of 
the period.102  By 2010, only one rental property owned by a nonresident 
landlord remained.103 
As the street improved, the multipurpose complex that occupied much of 
one side of the block remained in a state of neglect.  When asked to invest 
in the property (or sell it to somebody who would), the owners were 
initially reluctant.104  Once the owners recognized that the street was 
improving, however, they too began to reinvest in their property.  By 2010, 
the owners had moved their offices back into the building.  Down the 
block, the corner tavern proved more resistant.  After the neighbors worked 
with their city council representative to obtain removal of its troublesome 
patio, tensions continued.105  Since 2008, however, the tavern’s new 
owners have embraced street improvement, adding flowers and trees, and 
installing bicycle racks.  The patio was also rebuilt with neighborhood 
approval.  By 2010 the tavern was hosting the monthly meeting of the 
Alexis Street Block Club.106 
                                                                                                                             
 98. Id. In the experience of co-author Clifton, homeownership often but not always is 
associated with increased involvement in local block clubs. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See ZILLOW, supra note 69.  Web links that would identify specific properties are not 
included to preserve anonymity. 
 101. Garrett, supra note 56.  Sale and price confirmed by public records. ZILLOW, supra 
note 69.  Web links that would identify specific properties are not included to preserve 
anonymity. 
 102. Garrett, supra note 56.  Price and date confirmed by public records. ZILLOW, supra 
note 69.  Web links that would identify specific properties are not included to preserve 
anonymity. 
 103. Garrett, supra note 56. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.  Co-author Clifton witnessed these beautification efforts and joined the Alexis 
Street Block Club at one of their meetings. 
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Community problems have not ceased on Alexis Street.  For example, in 
2010 the local council member was pulled into a dispute involving one 
resident slandering another.  A block club member wrote, 
“[a]fter . . . seeing this neighborhood go from a dump and drug filled 
dangerous neighborhood to a vibrant community, I say no more throwing 
sand in the sand box.”107  Though problems continue, their character has 
changed—now associated more with the perennial issues of dealing with 
annoying neighbors in a dense urban space. 
The Collaborative eventually worked across a wider area, proceeding 
block by block.  Although each block presented particular challenges and 
opportunities, the approach that the Collaborative followed on Alexis Street 
was largely replicated elsewhere.108  Today, the area is an active real estate 
market.  Home values in the Collaborative’s zip code (which encompasses 
most of the West Side) increased by ninety percent between 2004 and 
2015.109  Although the Collaborative’s contribution to the change cannot be 
separately estimated, and other neighborhood organizations were also at 
work in the same area, the perception of the area among homebuyers has 
clearly been transformed. 
IV.  GOVERNING THE NEIGHBORHOOD COMMONS 
Neighborhood decline was well underway on Alexis Street in 2002, led 
by criminal activity in degraded housing, which prompted residents to 
adopt strategies of housing disinvestment.110  Yet by 2006 a turnaround 
was underway, as disinvestment gave way to renewed investment in the 
neighborhood.  Clearly there was collective intervention, as Galster 
                                                                                                                             
 107. E-mail from [name removed to preserve anonymity] to Harvey Garret and others 
[names removed to preserve anonymity] (July 21, 2010, 8:11 AM) (on file with co-author 
Clifton). 
 108. Garrett, supra note 56.  But see the discussion of an open-air drug market on one 
West Side street, infra notes 189-190 and accompanying text. 
 109. See an interactive graphic on zip code 14213 in Ted Mellnik et. al., America’s Great 
Housing Divide:  Are You A Winner or Loser?, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/business/wonk/housing/overview/ 
[https://perma.cc/B5UR-U5VG].  Based on an unconfirmed source at the Buffalo-Niagara 
Association of Realtors who conducted research at the Collaborative’s request, average 
home prices within the Collaborative’s focus area increased by 313% compared to 200% for 
the West Side generally between 2000 and 2010.  A local newspaper reported the following 
in 2008:  “According to an analysis completed by the Local Initiatives Support Corporation 
using Buffalo Niagara Association of Realtors data, neighborhoods west of Richmond have 
been the fastest growing real estate market in the city for several years.  Sales prices have 
increased 114 percent from 2000 through 2006 in the West Side Community Collaborative 
area.  For the city as a whole, values increased 27 percent during the same time.” West Side 
Rising, BUFFALO RISING (Dec. 24, 2008), https://www.buffalorising.com/2008/12/west-side-
rising/ [https://perma.cc/26Q4-Z52B]. 
 110. See Garrett, supra note 56. 
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suggests,111 but how and why did it work?112  If neighborhood decline 
responds to collective intervention, it becomes important to understand 
how to design interventions that work in diverse contexts and can be 
sustained in the long term.  Drawing on systematic field studies of various 
common-pool resources around the world, Elinor Ostrom distilled a set of 
eight institutional design principles associated with sustainable, user-
governed resource management.113  We use these principles as a template 
for analyzing the Alexis Street experience. 
A. Principle 1:  Clear Boundaries 
Effective commons governance requires clear boundaries around the 
commons, which allow individuals to identify whose use lies within the 
resource system.114  On Alexis Street the commons is primarily a street-
block, clearly defined by intersecting streets.  Householders easily 
recognize one another as members of a small and intimate community.  
Galster found that neighborhood quality directly affects upkeep behavior 
“only when the neighborhood is defined at a very localized (i.e., block-
face) geographic scale.”115  The dynamic observed on Alexis Street was 
limited mainly to a single block and bounded by it.  Because a 
neighborhood is not a fully open-access commons, the street-block defines 
a limited community of people who need to act collectively.116 
Rather than functioning as one large, undifferentiated commons, a city is 
partially partitioned by many identifiable boundaries, such as rivers, train 
tracks, highways, and especially surface streets.  Though permeable, these 
physical boundaries limit, to some extent, the impact of use-related 
interdependencies among parcels of property.  Wide avenues such as 
Richmond—the eastern border of the West Side—can function as a 
boundary that runs down the middle of the street.  On narrower streets, 
such as Alexis, the block-commons consists of both sides of a street:  the 
street-block.  Overall, a city is a configuration of interconnected blocks; 
each street-block is potentially a separable commons, though separable to 
                                                                                                                             
 111. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 112. A single case may, of course, be exceptional.  We use the case not to demonstrate 
the workability of commons remedies (well established in natural resource contexts around 
the world, see OSTROM, supra note 39) but to illustrate the mode of analysis that commons 
theory brings to neighborhood decline. 
 113. Id. at 258-59. 
 114. Id. at 260-62. 
 115. GALSTER, supra note 25, at 223.  Galster’s reference to a “block-face” is similar to 
our focus on a street-block. See id. at 79. 
 116. Note that the street-block is not a club good; residents are unable to exclude other 
residents, who gain entry to the neighborhood through the housing market. 
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differing degrees.  The street-block (in Galster’s terms, the block-face)117 
appears to be the relevant unit of collective action for the purpose of 
housing upkeep. 
B. Principle 2:  Proportional Sharing of Benefits and Costs 
Effective commons governance requires that the costs of collective 
action be shared among members of the community in rough proportion to 
the benefits each member receives.118  On Alexis Street, collective action 
allowed property owners to realize benefits commensurate with the costs of 
their property maintenance or re-investment.  As argued above, the 
neighborhood-commons poses mainly an assurance problem.119  Once 
solved, homeowners realize complementary benefits when they also invest 
in their own property rather than behaving as free riders. 
C. Principles 3 and 4:  Rule Making and Monitoring 
Effective commons governance requires that the user community 
participate in making the rules that govern resource use, monitor user 
behavior, and invoke the rules.120  Unlike many natural resource 
communities around the world,121 city residents lack authority to make and 
enforce their own neighborhood rules.  Rather, the rules governing property 
maintenance come from city and state governments in the form of housing 
codes.  The uniformity of housing-related rules is potentially a weakness in 
governing the neighborhood commons given the diversity of neighborhood 
standards and circumstances.122  However, Alexis Street residents did 
closely monitor compliance with rules and participated in the process of 
                                                                                                                             
 117. GALSTER, supra note 25, at 79. 
 118. See OSTROM, supra note 39, at 262-63. 
 119. See Runge, supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 120. See OSTROM, supra note 39, at 263-66.  The use of rules entails four legal processes:  
prescribing, invoking, applying, and enforcing rules. See id., at 59, 61; Ronald J. Oakerson, 
Representation:  A Slender Thread?, in INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY IN SELF-GOVERNING 
SOCIETIES:  THE BLOOMINGTON SCHOOL AND BEYOND 71, 74-76 (Filippo Sabetti & Dario 
Castiglione eds., 2017).  Prescription is legislative work, application is judicial work, and 
enforcement is executive work.  Invoking rules is perhaps executive work but is often 
carried out by citizens.  It is closely related to rules of standing in court.  Formally, housing 
rules are invoked by city inspectors, who write the citations that require offenders to appear 
in court.  Informally, however, Alexis Street residents participated in the process of 
invoking rules by bringing violations to the attention of inspectors and obtaining recognition 
as neighborhood representatives in housing court. See infra Section V.C. 
 121. See OSTROM, supra note 39, at 263-65. 
 122. For example, lot sizes vary among neighborhoods, but building codes or area zoning 
may dictate a larger lot size than found in some neighborhoods.  If a house in such a 
neighborhood is lost to fire, nothing can be built on the lot that remains.  Though empty lots 
can be put to good use, such as community gardens, they can also detract from the 
streetscape and thus contribute to decline. Numerous examples exist on Buffalo’s West 
Side. 
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invoking the rules in court, advising on application and enforcement.123  On 
Alexis Street, code enforcement was not a product of routine regulation by 
a government agency.  Rather, it was a process driven by neighborhood 
initiative and participation, in effect adding a coercive capability to 
otherwise voluntary collective action among neighbors.124 
D. Principle 5:  Available Sanctions 
Effective commons governance requires graduated sanctions to 
constrain user behavior.125  Potential code enforcement sanctions were 
effectively used on Alexis Street to leverage a holdout owner into 
abandoning his position.  Landlords who rent to drug dealers and 
prostitutes in a residential neighborhood are the classic “dog in the 
manger,” as Vincent Ostrom characterized the behavior of holdouts on the 
commons,126 pursuing their own benefit while ignoring costs to others.  
Their behavior signals the breakdown of collective action in the 
neighborhood, the reverse of the mutual assurance required to sustain 
housing upkeep.  Yet within Housing Court the holdout was given ample 
opportunity to comply with existing rules, and less punitive actions were 
always preferred.127  In this sense, sanctions were graduated.  Outside the 
courtroom the Collaborative typically sought cooperation from property 
owners, including absentee landlords, before seeking coercion.128  This 
approach often allowed residents to proceed with improvements without 
the costly time-delay involved in legal proceedings. 
E. Principle 6:  Conflict Resolution 
Effective commons governance requires that members of the user 
community have low-cost access to conflict-resolution facilities.129  On 
Alexis Street, recourse to an independent, authoritative third-party—
                                                                                                                             
 123. See the discussion of Housing Court, infra Section V.C. 
 124. Coercive capabilities always entail some risk of misuse.  One can imagine a 
neighborhood composed of busybodies who seek to intrude on one another’s upkeep 
decisions to their mutual dissatisfaction.  Some degree of conflict seems almost inevitable in 
the application of rules, underscoring the need for access to conflict-resolution facilities. See 
infra Section IV.E.  The ability of neighbors to invoke rules in court does not allow them to 
decide how those rules apply or what enforcement actions would be appropriate. 
 125. OSTROM, supra note 39, at 266-67. 
 126. OSTROM, supra note 55, at 50.  Ostrom described the “dog in the manger” strategy 
as pursuing one’s own advantage while disregarding the consequences for others.  It also 
entails using a resource meant for one purpose for an entirely different and conflicting 
purpose.  In commons terms, it is highly subtractive behavior.  The Dog in the Manger is 
one of Aesop’s Fables:  when the dog insists on sleeping in the manger, the ox goes hungry. 
 127. Nowak, supra note 56; see infra Section V.C. 
 128. Garrett, supra note 56. 
 129. OSTROM, supra note 39, at 267-68. 
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Housing Court—allowed the neighborhood to resolve disputes among 
property owners in accordance with established rules.  No member of the 
community needed to confront criminal gangs, who nonetheless lost their 
ability to intimidate residents.  Third parties other than courts can also be 
important.  Alexis Street residents effectively secured the assistance of their 
city council representative to resolve a conflict with the corner tavern, also 
by invoking established rules—not in court, but in a political venue.130 
F. Principle 7:  External Recognition 
Effective commons governance requires that external authorities 
recognize the user community’s right to organize and act collectively.131  
The City of Buffalo recognizes block clubs as legitimate organizations 
representing neighborhood interests.132  On Alexis Street, however, 
Housing Court provided the crucial recognition for neighborhood 
monitoring through the appointment of neighborhood residents as 
Community Liaisons.133 
G. Principle 8:  Nested Organization 
If the commons is large and complex, with nested levels of interaction 
among actors, effective commons governance requires that collective 
action occur at multiple, nested levels.134  Alexis Street residents did not 
act alone.  They were supported by a more inclusive group operating at a 
larger scale on the West Side—the West Side Community Collaborative.  
Cities are a complex, layered commons, in which small-scale effects 
confined to a street-block are nested within larger scale effects extending to 
an urban district, such as the West Side.  Adjacent blocks and streets affect 
one another, as the Collaborative’s block-by-block strategy recognized.  
Although the primary unit of collective action for the purpose of housing 
upkeep is the street-block, the surrounding neighborhood clearly has an 
interest in fostering and assisting collective action on any given block.  
Once housing blight has permeated a street-block, housing on an adjacent 
block is easily affected.  There is no single, ideal level of collective action 
among the complex relationships on the urban commons; the layered nature 
of the urban commons requires more than a single level of collective 
organization.135  On the West Side, block clubs were nested within the 
                                                                                                                             
 130. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 131. OSTROM, supra note 39, at 268-69. 
 132. See Block Clubs or Tenant Council, CITY OF BUFFALO, http://www.ci.buffalo.ny.us/
Home/CityServices/BlocksClubs_TenantCouncil [https://perma.cc/VAR4-LJMT]. 
 133. See infra Section V.C. 
 134. OSTROM, supra note 39, at 269-70. 
 135. See Galster, supra note 8, at 2114. 
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Collaborative and other West Side organizations enabling residents to take 
account of both small-scale and larger scale effects.  The Collaborative 
brought greater social capital, and the housing agency, greater financial 
capital, to bear on a particular street-block than its residents could muster 
alone. 
Unlike a resource commons, the neighborhood is both produced and 
consumed by neighborhood residents and property owners.136  Applied to 
urban neighborhoods, the commons model includes in the same frame two 
sets of activities usually analyzed separately:  property upkeep and property 
use.  Residents contribute to the neighborhood in a variety of ways, 
whether by painting the fence or planting flowers, or by abstaining from 
behaviors that subtract from the enjoyment of neighbors, especially those 
that make the neighborhood feel unsafe.  The turnaround on Alexis Street 
did not occur until highly subtractive behaviors ended, and residents, as 
well as visitors and potential buyers, could see visible and sustained 
improvement.  In particular, interior renovation was not sufficient.137  
Consistent with Galster’s findings,138 observable changes transformed 
perceptions of the block and its future. 
V.  FACILITATING COLLECTIVE ACTION 
The ordinary act of painting your house is collective action in the urban 
context.  Note the tacit nature of collective action among neighbors:  
decisions related to housing upkeep are strongly influenced by the behavior 
of those who inhabit the same street-block, but there is no explicit 
agreement among neighbors to maintain their property.  Assured of positive 
behavior by your neighbors, you gain from upkeep, but lacking that 
assurance, you may choose to defer maintenance expenses.  Assurance is 
nonetheless tacit, based on mutual perceptions rather than an explicit 
bargain.  The presence of a holdout that declines to observe neighborhood 
standards—a dog in the manger who ignores neighborhood 
consequences—is especially threatening in this context.  Collective action 
breaks down, and a vicious circle of disinvestment sets in.  When this 
happens, neighbors need some way to restart collective action on the block, 
recreating the mutual assurance on which housing upkeep depends. 
The history of neighborhood decline and continued erosion of the 
housing stock in the United States139 suggests that collective action related 
to housing upkeep has broken down in many urban neighborhoods.  
Moreover, the erosion of the housing stock has occurred in the presence of 
                                                                                                                             
 136. See id. at 2116. 
 137. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 138. See generally GALSTER, supra note 25. 
 139. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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municipal institutions intended to prevent it—housing codes and a corps of 
city inspectors to cite violators in courts.140  The study of common-pool 
resources suggests that direct user involvement in the regulatory process is 
a more effective means of sustaining the resource than a reliance on the 
exclusive exercise of authority by government agents.141  The commons 
avoids tragedy when users act collectively. 
Garrett Hardin touted two institutional remedies for the tragedy of the 
commons:  private property and administrative regulation.142  Both turn out 
to be ineffective in stemming the erosion of the urban housing stock.  The 
housing market treats the neighborhood as divisible among homeowners, 
leaving spillovers to be regulated by city authorities through the services of 
building inspectors.  Markets hasten neighborhood decline in the presence 
of highly subtractive users—adjusting housing prices in the neighborhood 
downward, further dampening residents’ incentives to reinvest.  At the 
same time, city inspectors may be unresponsive to the highly local 
conditions present on specific city blocks. 
We argue that the strongest incentives to address neighborhood decline 
lie with neighborhood homeowners.  Like natural resource users who have 
strong incentives to overcome barriers to collective action when their 
livelihoods are at stake,143 homeowners, whose principal capital investment 
is most often the home,144 may have equally strong incentives to act when 
their property values are at stake.  But overcoming the barriers to collective 
action can be costly, sometimes prohibitively so.145  If selling out is 
perceived to be the better strategy, the tragedy of the neighborhood 
commons accelerates. 
When collective action is tacit, it is especially sensitive to issues of 
perception.  Two factors underlie perception:  direct observations and the 
mental models used to interpret those observations.146  Altering perceptions 
depends on altering one or both of those factors.  The West Side 
Community Collaborative addressed both:  changing what residents could 
see—evicting drug dealers and prostitutes, removing trash, renovating 
structures, painting exteriors—and modifying how residents thought about 
their neighborhood, implicitly, we argue, urging them to think of their 
                                                                                                                             
 140. See KUSHNER ET AL., supra note 1, at 418-22. 
 141. OSTROM, supra note 14, at 93. 
 142. Hardin, supra note 12, at 1244-45. 
 143. OSTROM, supra note 14, at 26, 34. 
 144. FENNELL, supra note 11, at 174. 
 145. See OSTROM, supra note 14, at 40. 
 146. For a lucid discussion of the factors underlying perception see the bestseller by New 
York Times columnist David Brooks. DAVID BROOKS, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL:  THE HIDDEN 
SOURCES OF LOVE, CHARACTER, AND ACHIEVEMENT 180-82 (2012). 
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particular block as a commons.  Changing observables requires direct 
action, while changing mental models relies on communication and 
dialogue.  Moreover, each factor interacts with the other.  Changing one’s 
mental model can lead to direct action, while the success of direct action 
can reinforce a change in mental models. 
Facilitating collective action among urban neighbors depends both on 
changing observables and on changing the mental models individuals use 
to assign meaning to observables.  Based on the Collaborative’s wider 
experience on the West Side, we suggest three intervention strategies:  (1) 
fostering a shared sense of responsibility among neighbors for the 
neighborhood commons—a basic change in the mental models that 
residents use to conceptualize the neighborhood and their relation to it; (2) 
leveraging investment, neighbor-to-neighbor—taking direct action to alter 
observables that influence perception; and (3) enabling neighbors to access 
coercion collectively and as a group obtain the enforcement of housing 
rules—an institutional strategy for dealing with holdouts whose behavior is 
highly subtractive.  By invoking the formal rules related to housing upkeep, 
neighbors make explicit the otherwise tacit expectations that enable a 
neighborhood to sustain the maintenance of the housing stock. 
A. Obstacles to Neighborhood Responsibility 
The Collaborative encountered five main obstacles to the acceptance of 
joint responsibility on the West Side:  weak incentives, feelings of 
isolation, narrow conceptions of responsibility, the law surrounding private 
property, and, paradoxically, a strong sense of punitive justice. 
1. Incentives 
One factor strongly affecting the incentive to participate in collective 
action is homeownership.  Renters are less likely to view themselves as 
permanent residents whose long-term interests are tied to the condition of 
the neighborhood.  Some significant degree of homeownership on each 
street-block seems to be a necessary condition of collective action at that 
level.147  As Alexis Street turned around, homeownership increased, and 
some renters became homeowners on the same block.148 
2. Isolation 
Even homeowners residing on the same street-block may have difficulty 
acting collectively.  The costs of collective action include substantial time 
and effort.  Feelings of solidarity among neighbors reduce those costs, as 
feelings of isolation increase them.  When residents saw members of the 
                                                                                                                             
 147. See ROTHENBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 287. 
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438 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
Collaborative planting a garden or cleaning a vacant lot on the West Side, 
they would often exclaim, “Thank God you are here!  I’ve been fighting 
this battle by myself for years.”149  Residents who feel isolated are unable 
to act collectively.  Galster found that low solidarity—perceived 
helpfulness, friendliness, similarity, and commonality among neighbors—
discourages home maintenance.150  External assistance, such as the 
Collaborative provided on Alexis Street, can overcome feelings of 
isolation, displacing a mental model of oneself as an isolated individual 
with a model of oneself as a member of a functional community. 
3. Boundaries of Responsibility 
All individuals must determine the limit of their responsibility for others.  
One is clearly responsible for one’s own house and grounds, especially if 
one is a homeowner, but this is a privatized sense of responsibility, the sort 
characterized by Alexis de Tocqueville in his classic account of New 
England towns as “a narrow selfishness, marked out by four sunk fences 
and a quickset hedge.”151  It was a broader sense of responsibility that 
impressed Tocqueville about New England, a willingness to take a 
proportionate responsibility for the care of the village.152  In order to 
recognize the decline of their block as a problem shared in common with 
others, not “my problem” but “our problem,” neighbors must modify their 
mental models to extend the scope of their responsibility beyond their own 
property lines.  As a neighborhood deteriorates individual residents may 
assume, without communication, that others do not care about their shared 
urban space and mirror that attitude themselves.153  One obstacle to joint 
responsibility may be neighborhood decline itself. 
A narrowly defined sense of responsibility is reinforced by the design of 
municipal institutions.  Centralized municipalities foster the idea that City 
                                                                                                                             
 149. Garrett, supra note 56; personal observation by co-author Clifton. 
 150. GALSTER, supra note 25, at 218-19. 
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Henry Reeve trans., Cambridge:  Sever and Francis 1850). 
 152. Id. at 69-71. 
 153. Neighbors’ responses to one another may reflect correspondence bias, in social 
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Hall is responsible for the neighborhood, not neighborhood residents acting 
collectively.  Residents come to believe that if something is wrong, one 
should call the City and wait for officials to act, and if the City fails to act, 
the response is to complain bitterly.154  The Collaborative operated on a 
contrary principle—that citizens are more productive when they spend their 
time “doing stuff” instead of seeking funding or trying to get others to act 
in their interest.155  Inaction from City Hall should not be allowed to get in 
the way of neighborhood action.  Residents must be willing to mobilize 
their own resources and turn them into fresh coats of paint, new plantings, 
boarded-up vacant structures, and other completed items on a long to-do 
list. 
4. The Law of Trespass 
When a threat to neighborhood wellbeing is located on private property, 
legal conceptions—in particular the law of trespass—inhibit residents from 
taking direct action to address the threat.  As Fennell notes, “owners of real 
estate usually have the right to prohibit others from entering their property, 
even when the trespass would cause no damage.”156  Getting residents to 
take direct action often required some convincing; many residents are 
paralyzed by respect for private property—a mental model that is 
notoriously strong in American culture.  A striking challenge to this 
mentality in declining neighborhoods is the abandoned house—an 
invitation to criminal activity and squatting that poses a fire hazard.157  
Usually, when a vacant house needed to be sealed the Collaborative 
thought it prudent to ask the city to do it initially, while advising residents 
to monitor the property and, at the first sign of forced entry, reseal it 
themselves.158  Yet, if neighbors continually wait for the city—the only 
entity lawfully empowered to board up privately-owned property—
squatters (we conjecture) will continue to make the rational calculation that 
a few weeks of shelter is worth the few minutes it might take to pry off a 
board.  However, the local citizen who within hours is able to spot the point 
of entry and then secure it will dissuade potential squatters, who are 
unlikely to spend time breaking into a house when they can sleep in another 
abandoned property that is not so closely watched.  The Collaborative 
assumed that one can seal, clean, paint, and mow the lawn without any 
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 156. FENNELL, supra note 11, at 88. 
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 158. Garrett, supra note 56. 
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legitimate party reacting negatively, including the absent owner.159 
 Recourse to direct action exposes the mismatch between the nature of an 
urban neighborhood and the legal institutions (as well as cultural norms) 
used to organize and govern its use.  As Fennell argues, private property in 
the urban context is not as private as it might seem.160  Property law treats 
each parcel as private property, subject to the law of trespass, trumped only 
by the action of a distant City Hall.161  In order to act responsibly from a 
neighborhood standpoint, residents must often act outside those 
conventional legal and cultural boundaries. 
5. A Punitive Sense of Justice   
Sometimes neighborhood responsibility means performing the 
responsibilities of neighbors, such as painting a house its owner cannot 
afford to paint—or is too stingy to paint.  West Side residents often resisted 
this strategy, arguing instead for punishing non-cooperators—in commons 
terms, holdouts.  The urge to punish, we argue, derives from a mental 
model that sees punitive justice as a first priority in most social 
circumstances.  The Collaborative followed a different strategy:  punitive 
measures were sought only when useful as a means of preserving the 
neighborhood.162  This approach can be viewed as an extension of the 
principle of graduated sanctions for governing the commons to include 
generosity and forgiveness as a means of fostering solidarity.163 
Fostering neighborhood responsibility requires ongoing discussion 
among neighborhood residents.  The Collaborative provided a forum for 
such discussions on the West Side.  The concept of the neighborhood as 
commons can contribute to such a process by providing residents with a 
mental model for understanding the nature of the neighborhood and their 
role as commons users in its governance.  In maintaining a sense of 
community, however, there is no substitute for ongoing communication.  
Neighborhood associations and block clubs play a key role in this process.   
Given a shared sense of responsibility for the neighborhood, residents of 
declining neighborhoods need strategies for reversing a cycle of 
disinvestment—leveraging housing upkeep in an environment that has 
discouraged it.  We turn next to this issue. 
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2017] REFRAMING NEIGHBORHOOD DECLINE 441 
B. Leveraging Investment 
Reversing the tragedy of the neighborhood-commons requires making 
housing investments that encourage others to invest as well.  Housing 
maintenance and investment in an urban neighborhood are strategic 
decisions in the sense that individual homeowner decisions depend on the 
decisions of others on the street-block.164  We argue that this 
interdependency can lead either to a cycle of disinvestment or a cycle of re-
investment.  Both are subject to threshold effects as well as perception 
issues.  Threshold effects occur when changes are discontinuous.  In an 
urban neighborhood neighbors may tolerate lack of housing upkeep by 
others up to a point, after which it affects their own upkeep decisions.  
Those decisions are affected by how residents perceive their neighborhood 
and its future—perceptions that are influenced by signaling events, i.e., 
observables that send signals to neighbors indicating trends:  perhaps the 
abandonment of a house or a lawn left uncut for an entire summer, or the 
reverse, the renovation of a longstanding eyesore. 
The strategic homeowner does not strictly follow her preferences when 
deciding whether or how to invest in the home.  Instead of making 
decisions about housing maintenance and upgrades based solely on the 
condition of the property and personal preferences, homeowners take into 
account the condition and use of surrounding property.  For example, 
because the condition of surrounding property limits the visual effect of 
exterior investment, homeowners in a degraded neighborhood may choose 
to upgrade interiors but not exteriors.165 
Complementarities make it possible to use an initial investment to 
leverage further investment among neighbors.  Because a homeowner may 
realize a greater return from painting her house when her neighbor also 
paints her house, painting can spread through the neighborhood—blight in 
reverse.166  Homeowners who are willing to risk going first can leverage 
improvements from others. 
Some individuals may choose to invest in neighborhood property despite 
prevailing disinvestment; we call them counter-investors, persons who 
invest against the neighborhood trend.  Counter-investment potentially can 
reverse a disinvestment cycle by encouraging others also to invest, but 
counter-investments must be carefully selected for their leveraging 
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potential.  If the neighborhood is a commons, it follows that counter-
investment should improve what neighbors share most in common.  This 
means improving primarily the most visible portions of the streetscape—
the street, front yards, and front facades—observables that inform 
homeowner decisions:  “Should I move away?  Should I put on a new roof?  
Should I mow my lawn today?”  Backyard and interior improvements, like 
remodeling and weatherization, we conjecture, do little or nothing to alter 
neighbors’ upkeep decisions (just as Alexis Street continued to decline 
after new residents renovated the interior of their home on the corner).167 
Though it is difficult to identify precisely, a threshold must be crossed 
before expectations on a street-block flip and the cycle of disinvestment 
reverses, altering the perceptions not only of block residents but also of 
external actors, including real estate brokers.  This threshold will be 
somewhat different for different persons, depending on individual tolerance 
for neighborhood disarray or individual reading of neighborhood signals 
that indicate a turnaround.  Differing thresholds were apparent on Alexis 
Street.168  Some people only need one new investment to begin to reinvest 
(the Browns); others need a little more evidence (Wanda).  Still others need 
nearly everyone to reinvest before they reinvest (the tavern).169  Differing 
thresholds among neighbors are compatible with neighborhood turnaround 
as long as investment momentum is picked up and maintained by 
individuals until a second threshold—a group threshold—is crossed.  In the 
end the evidence of turnaround is obvious and the common perception 
emerges that ‘this is a good place to invest and everyone thinks so.’ 
C. Obtaining Enforcement 
Like most commons, neighborhoods are rule-governed spaces.  Cities 
use their police powers to regulate land use, housing, and public 
behavior.170  Of greatest interest for neighborhood decline is the housing 
code, which stipulates various conditions that housing is required to 
satisfy.171  Many of these rules obviously are unenforced—the extent of 
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neighborhood decline being the prime evidence.172  Neighborhood 
collective action may often hinge on rule enforcement to deal with 
holdouts, raising the question of the neighborhood’s access to coercion. 
Unusual among cities, Buffalo has a separate Housing Court, created by 
state law in 1978.173  The law provides wide discretion to housing judges: 
Regardless of the relief originally sought by a party, the court may 
recommend or employ any remedy, program, procedure or sanction 
authorized by law for the enforcement of housing standards, if it believes 
they will be more effective to accomplish compliance or to protect and 
promote the public interest . . . . The court may retain continuing 
jurisdiction of any action or proceeding relating to a building until all 
violations of law have been removed.174 
Yet, the creation of an institution with discretion does not guarantee that 
it will be effectively used.  Inspectors can write citations and the court can 
fine violators, but the deterioration of the housing stock will proceed if the 
court does not deal effectively with persistent violators in a manner that 
alters neighborhood perceptions of decline—exactly what occurred on 
Alexis Street prior to Judge Nowak’s arrival on the bench.175 
In 2003, just as the West Side Community Collaborative was getting 
underway, Henry Nowak was assigned to preside over Buffalo’s Housing 
Court as a newly elected member of the panel of judges that comprise City 
Court.176  Judge Nowak conceived of Housing Court as a problem-solving 
venue.  If its role were mainly punitive, he maintains, there would be no 
point in having a separate court:  “But,” he notes, “if you want to get the 
roof fixed, you need a special court and special legislation.”177  In his 
personal copy of the legislation, Judge Nowak had circled and re-circled 
the “or” in “to accomplish compliance or to protect and promote the public 
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interest.”178  How to determine the public interest and bring it to bear in 
court was the institutional puzzle he had to solve. 
In the seven years that followed, beginning with the Alexis Street case, 
Judge Nowak greatly expanded the scope of the court in two basic ways.  
First, he moved away from a punitive approach toward one based on 
problem solving.179  Just as the Collaborative found at the neighborhood 
level, punishment and problem solving are often antithetical.  Nowak 
acknowledged that many of the defendants brought before him were 
slumlords, drug dealers, or gangsters.  “There is one way,” he said, “I can 
guarantee you the property will not be fixed:  if I throw him [the owner] in 
jail.”180  Likewise, instead of simply imposing fines, he used the threat of 
fines as leverage to push reluctant property owners to invest in their 
property or sell it to somebody who would, as he did with the delinquent 
owner of four properties on Alexis Street.181  Owners could mitigate their 
fines if they made repairs, and with full compliance an owner could usually 
avoid penalties entirely. 
Although previous analysts have treated code enforcement as a potential 
contributor to housing abandonment, driving up costs for landlords unable 
to recover those costs from low-income renters,182 the problem-solving 
nature of Housing Court achieved the reverse.  Unfortunately, a problem-
solving focus is much more labor intensive.  Nowak estimated that a typical 
case required twenty or more appearances to be resolved.183 
Nowak’s second basic change focused on neighborhood involvement, 
needed if Housing Court was to be a problem-solving venue.  Echoing Jane 
Jacobs, he notes that citizens are the “best eyes and ears” on the street; they 
often know the offending property’s history and can keep close tabs on it in 
the future.184  Neighborhood involvement does not just happen, however, 
and initially it did not happen in Judge Nowak’s courtroom.  He remedied 
this in two ways:  first, by rearranging the court calendar, at the suggestion 
of neighborhood leaders, so that they knew when cases from their 
neighborhood would be heard; and, second, by appointing Housing Court 
Community Liaisons.185 
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When Judge Nowak began scheduling cases by district, each of the 
city’s nine districts was allotted a morning or afternoon.  In the judge’s 
words, “everything changed.”186  Community members knew the details of 
the properties intimately and had valuable information about them, 
including their history and current condition.  They began coming to court 
because they realized that, as Harvey notes, “for two hours a week [one 
could] see every single case in your area.”187  The scheduling change also 
made it easier for the neighborhood to work with city inspectors.  As 
Clifton observed, the hallway outside of Housing Court became a place of 
lively exchange, where neighbors buttonholed inspectors, contact 
information was obtained, and services discussed.  Furthermore, often the 
judge would direct defendants to talk to community members so they could 
be connected to resources. 
Eventually, Housing Court Liaisons numbered some twenty-five 
community residents from around the city, including co-author Jeremy 
Clifton. The liaisons were recruited from various community-based 
organizations—AmeriCorps, block clubs, and others—and trained by the 
court.  Training was straightforward.  The group did not know, and did not 
need to know, many details about the actual housing codes because all 
properties still went through qualified inspectors.  As Clifton observed, the 
typical process still involved citizen request, inspection by a city housing 
inspector, re-inspection, write-up for court, and judge-mandated follow-up 
inspections.  Judge Nowak summarized all that the liaisons needed to know 
about the housing code on more than one occasion, “Everything . . . should 
be in good repair.”188  Instead, the group was trained to understand the 
inspections process and help fellow residents to understand it, navigate it, 
request inspections, gather additional information, and share the results 
with the court.  Each week, liaisons touched base with block club members 
concerning various properties.  They also walked their neighborhoods, 
often on the morning before the afternoon Judge Nowak had assigned cases 
from the district, to visit properties, gather neighborhood concerns, and 
take pictures. 
In court, the liaisons confirmed implementation of court orders, 
including the work of city inspectors, property owners, police, and tenants.  
They sat in reserved front-row seats, and Judge Nowak gave them an 
opportunity to provide input on every case.  Sometimes they had no input 
to give, but usually they could provide timely information on the current 
state of the property, the opinions of the neighbors, or the history of the 
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property.  In short, liaisons had no actual power but enjoyed extraordinary 
access to a judge with broad powers. 
As daily monitors of their neighborhoods, liaisons could also identify 
emerging problems in a timely manner.  For example, in January 2008, 
when co-author Clifton was making his usual rounds visiting properties 
that would appear in court that week, he noticed something suspicious.  
One property appeared newly unoccupied, as there was no path through 
snow that had fallen several days before, either shoveled or packed down.  
There was, however, one track of suspiciously solitary footprints running 
down the side of the house. Clifton followed them, and they ended at a 
broken window—a sign of unauthorized entry.  Then he realized he could 
hear the sound of rushing water.  Glancing about for some sign of a stream, 
he noticed the sound was coming from the window. Grabbing the window 
ledge, he hoisted himself up to discover a waterfall roaring down a flight of 
stairs.  He called the water company directly, but they would not turn off 
the water because the bill was in good standing.  However, in court that 
afternoon, a liaison relayed this information to Judge Nowak, who ordered 
the water company to turn off the water.  Apparently, at the beginning of 
the month the tenants had moved out without notifying the landlord, turned 
off the heat, and the pipes had burst.  Timely citizen access to coercion was 
useful in correcting an obvious problem that, if left unchecked, could 
broadly and negatively impact an already struggling block. 
Liaisons often recommended court inaction.  For instance, inspectors 
may cite a house with numerous and extensive violations; however, it may 
also be the newly purchased, first home of a low-income family who will 
need months, perhaps years, to correct the violations.  After making sure 
the neighbors are on board, a liaison can report to the court that the 
property is being slowly rehabilitated, and the neighbors would like the 
court to give the owner time to finish.  Indeed, the most frequent input that 
co-author Clifton gave the court was to request additional time on behalf of 
a low-income homeowner.  More time was almost always granted.  In this 
way a low-income family has a chance to succeed instead of being forced 
to pay fines and/or sell the property to someone who has the capital to 
correct the violations quickly.  Another example of recommended inaction 
included properties in court because of specific health problems.  For 
example, a lawn might be overgrown because an elderly man broke his hip 
and had been unable to secure assistance.  Often a liaison can connect the 
elderly or disabled with a local resident willing to lend a hand during the 
summer.  Judge Nowak was sensitive to these contextual issues. 
Housing Court works well to constrain holdouts when the offending 
parties own or occupy housing in the neighborhood, but that is not always 
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the case.  Three blocks west of Richmond, on 19th Street, the Collaborative 
encountered an open-air Saturday drug market.189  Unlike the limited 
access to the neighborhood for residents, mediated by the real estate 
market, the street market emerged as a result of open access to the street.190  
Open access is much more problematic than the limited access available to 
residents because of the difficulty in identifying offenders and the higher 
costs of monitoring.191  The Collaborative organized neighborhood 
cleanups to coincide with the Saturday drug market.192  Responding to the 
Collaborative’s initiative, the Erie County District Attorney’s office 
declared a “no plea bargain” policy for drug arrests made on the street, and 
Family Court agreed to haul teenage drug-runners into court instead of 
sending them to a probation officer.193  The drug market soon disappeared 
from the neighborhood.194 
Organized as a problem-solving venue, Housing Court was accessible to 
neighborhood residents, reliant on neighborhood knowledge and resident 
monitoring, and sensitive to neighborhood conditions calling for differing 
degrees of leniency or strictness of enforcement.  The court’s ability to 
constrain the holdout position often taken by landlords was clearly 
instrumental in curtailing neighborhood decline on the West Side, as 
illustrated in our detailed account of Alexis Street.195  However, the court’s 
strength—a heavy reliance on judicial discretion that provides ample 
flexibility in dealing with individual cases—is also a potential source of 
weakness; sustaining the neighborhood-friendly approach taken by Judge 
Nowak depends on the development of a problem-solving tradition in the 
court that can survive a succession of judges. 
Conceivably, more can be done to strengthen the capacity for collective 
action in urban neighborhoods.  Suburban neighborhoods often have 
institutional arrangements capable of addressing holdout problems—
homeowners associations (HOAs), in which membership is compulsory, 
organized by means of deed covenants put in place by subdivision 
developers and enforceable in court.196  The purpose of these institutions is 
congruent with the need for collective action in urban neighborhoods—
both aim at maintaining property values and sustaining neighborhood 
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amenities.  By institutionalizing the process of collective action, HOAs 
move neighborhood collective action out of the tacit dimension.  The 
negative externalities most suburban homeowners face, however, pale in 
comparison to those that confront urban residents; yet it is urban 
neighborhoods that typically lack coercive capabilities.  The creation of 
compulsory homeowners associations in urban neighborhoods would 
require unanimity among property owners in the neighborhood in order to 
add the appropriate covenant to each and every deed—a requirement 
almost sure to face insurmountable holdout problems.197  State enabling 
legislation would be needed to create a capacity for neighborhood 
incorporation by majority or supermajority vote.198  An urban 
neighborhood incorporated on a homeowner association model would have 
the ability to make housing rules and collectively invoke those rules in 
court without having to rely on city inspectors.199  Such an institution 
comes closer to fulfilling Ostrom’s principles of sustainable commons 
governance, in particular Principle 5, by endowing urban neighborhoods 
with independent rule-making and rule-invoking authority.200 
CONCLUSION 
Elinor Ostrom’s principles of commons governance can readily be 
adapted to the study of the neighborhood commons in American cities.  By 
using the street-block as the primary unit of analysis one can perceive the 
relevant relationships among neighbors and observe their decision-making 
dynamic over time.  Moreover, subject to further research, the West Side 
experience strongly suggests that neighborhood blight is a block-level 
problem that responds to block-level remedies.  Voluntary associations of 
householders—block clubs—can coordinate collective action and strategic 
investment among neighbors, monitor neighborhood behavior, and invoke 
housing-related rules.  At the same time, larger-scale neighborhood 
organizations can bring the social capital of a wider district to bear on the 
issues addressed at the street-block level. 
Neighborhoods are not inherently helpless in the face of external forces 
that drive neighborhood decline, as often thought.  The succession of 
neighborhood income levels from higher to lower, driven in part by 
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suburbanization, need not lead inevitably to the erosion of the urban 
housing stock:  what matters is how neighborhoods respond to these and 
other external forces.  Neighbors that can sustain a collective response, 
providing mutual assurance of housing upkeep, can forestall decline or 
even reverse decline already underway.  The ability of neighborhoods to 
act collectively, especially at the level of the street-block, is critical to an 
effective neighborhood response. 
Neighborhood collective action, however, is not spontaneous but 
depends on specific enabling conditions.  A host of factors discourage 
residents from taking responsibility for their neighborhood:  lack of 
homeownership and the long-term interest it fosters in favorable 
neighborhood conditions; isolation from neighbors and a resulting lack of 
trust; narrow conceptions of self-interest that exclude the wellbeing of 
neighbors; the law of trespass, which inhibits residents from taking direct 
action when neighboring property poses a threat; and a strong sense of 
punitive justice, which prompts residents to punish holdouts rather than 
compensate for their non-cooperation when possible.201  Overcoming these 
factors requires residents to alter the mental models they use to 
conceptualize the neighborhood, which, in turn, requires ongoing 
communication among neighbors, sufficient to sustain a shared sense of 
neighborhood responsibility.  The concept of the neighborhood as 
commons is useful not only as a tool of analysis for community organizers 
but also as a mental model for city dwellers, one that reshapes the way they 
understand their neighborhoods. 
Residents who seek to encourage upkeep on the part of their neighbors 
may need to modify their own investment strategies in favor of 
observables—prioritizing external improvements that the neighbors can see 
over internal improvements that remain invisible from the outside.  One 
effective way to encourage your neighbor to paint her house is to paint your 
own.  The same consideration applies to cutting the grass, planting flowers, 
and picking up litter. 
For the hard cases, however, that require neighbors to confront holdouts 
whose behavior manifestly threatens the future of the neighborhood, what 
is required is access to coercion.  This is what Buffalo’s Housing Court 
provided through its neighborhood-friendly approach:  easing access by 
residents by scheduling neighborhood cases on a regular day of the week 
and using neighborhood liaisons as housing monitors—the eyes and ears of 
the court—and as advisors to the court on the appropriateness of court 
orders and sanctions.202  The key is not the use of coercion in routine ways 
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by city administrators but, rather, neighborhood access to coercion as part 
of a problem-solving process.  Buffalo’s Housing Court added a coercive 
capability to the otherwise voluntary instruments of collective action 
available to neighborhood residents, enabling them to monitor the 
application and enforcement of the housing code in their neighborhood. 
Critics of the approach described here may be inclined to dismiss any 
effort to reverse neighborhood decline as gentrification—succession in 
reverse.  Although a full discussion lies beyond the scope of this paper, 
gentrification can threaten the preservation of stable neighborhoods for 
low-income residents.203  When “gentrification” is used loosely to refer to 
any degree of displacement of lower income residents by higher income 
residents, however, nearly any process of neighborhood improvement may 
qualify as gentrification.  If instead we reserve “gentrification” for a high 
degree of displacement, we conjecture that a major contributing factor is 
the scale of development.  Large-scale developments aimed at a high-
income clientele can have a large impact on the composition and character 
of a lower-income neighborhood.  Much like resisting neighborhood 
decline, resisting gentrification at the hands of large-scale developers may 
also turn upon neighborhood collective action, albeit of a different sort and 
on a district level rather than a street-block.204 
In the meantime, much of the housing stock in urban America continues 
to be lost to blight, abandonment, and demolition.  Factors both external 
and internal to cities and their neighborhoods are at work.  When internal 
factors weigh heavily, commons research suggests practical remedies:  
tragedy can be averted—provided that neighborhood residents act 
collectively.  An important priority for urban policy is then to facilitate 
collective action, block by block. 
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